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Liability of the State and its Employees
for the Negligent Investigation of Child
Abuse Reports
This note argues that the State of Alaska and its social workers
owe a duty of care to protect children identified to them as victims
of abuse. If a plaintiff can prove a breach of this duty and an
injury proximately caused by that breach, under the Alaska
governmental immunity statute the State should be held liable for
the negligent investigation of a child abuse report. Individual
social workers, however, are protected by qualified immunity
under the common law doctrine of official immunity. Imposing
liability on the State, and not on individual social workers, is also
the best solution from a policy standpoint, as it deters negligence,
compensates victims, and limits the problems of overintervention
and interference with the effective functioning of government.
I. INTRODUCrION
Like many other states, Alaska has a child protection program
designed to prevent child abuse. The program is governed by Title
47 of the Alaska Code' and is administered by the Department of
Health and Social Services ("DHSS"). However, as investigations
by social service agencies are sometimes insufficient or negligent,
reporting a suspected case of child abuse to an agency such as
DHSS does not always ensure protection from further abuse.
Studies in several states show that approximately twenty-five percent
of all child fatalities resulting from abuse or neglect occur after the
abuse has been reported to a child protective agency.2 "Tens of
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1. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 47.10.080-.490, 47.17.010-.290 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
2. Douglas J. Besharov, Protecting Children from Abuse: Should It Be a Legal
Duty?, 11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 509, 510 (1986) (citing REGION VI RESOURCE
CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECr, CHILD DEATHS IN TEXAS 26 (1981)).
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thousands of other children" have been seriously injured while
under the protection of a social service agency.3
Due to a rising awareness of this problem, the imposition of
liability on the State and/or individual social workers for the
negligent handling of child abuse reports has been an increasingly
litigated issue in recent years. The United States Supreme Court
addressed this issue in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services.4 In DeShaney, the Court held that a State's
failure to remove a child from his home after receiving reports of
severe abuse did not violate the child's due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 However, the Court left open the
possibility that the State might be liable under its own tort law in
this situation, stating that "[i]t may well be that, by voluntarily
undertaking to protect [the child] against a danger it concededly
played no part in creating, the State acquired a duty under state tort
law to provide him with adequate protection against that danger."6
In response to DeShaney, many state courts have recently consid-
ered the possibility of imposing tort liability for the negligent
handling of child abuse reports. In Alaska, at least one suit against
the State for the negligent investigation of a child abuse report is
currently pending.7
This note considers whether Alaska courts should impose tort
liability on the State of Alaska and/or state social workers for the
negligent investigation of child abuse reports. Part II argues that
the State and its employees assume a duty of care toward children
3. Id.; see also Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse:
The Need to Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 539, 551 (1985).
4. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
5. Id. at 196-97. Although the Supreme Court foreclosed the possibility of
liability under the United States Constitution, it is still possible that liability could
arise under the Alaska Constitution's Due Process Clause. This note, however, is
concerned with the more widely explored issue of tort liability and does not address
the separate issue of liability under the Alaska Constitution.
6. Id. at 201-02 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th
ed. 1984)).
7. Estate of Todd Burnette v. State, No. 3AN-91-3595 CI (Superior Court of
Alaska, Third Judicial District, 1992 Term). In Burnette, the investigating social
workers were originally named as defendants but have since been dismissed from
the action. In return, the State has dropped its official immunity argument. See
Stipulation and Order, Estate of Todd Burnette v. State, No. 3AN-91-3595 CI
(Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Jan. 21, 1993).
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reported to them as the victims of child abuse and that the remain-
ing elements of negligence should be determined on a case-by-case
basis. Part III addresses the issue of governmental immunity and
concludes that under Alaska law, while individual social workers are
protected from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity, the
State may be held liable for negligence. Part IV examines the
policy arguments favoring and opposing the imposition of liability
on the State and/or individual social workers and argues that
imposing liability solely on the State advances sound public policy.
Finally, part V concludes that the State of Alaska must be held
liable for the negligent investigation of child abuse reports by its
employees. Investigating social workers, however, should be
immune from liability so long as they have conducted their
investigations in good faith.
II. NEGLIGENCE
To impose liability for the negligent handling of child abuse
reports, the three elements of negligence must be shown: duty,
breach of duty and an injury proximately caused by the breach.'
As in most states that have addressed the issue, Alaska, under Title
47 of the Alaska Code, has established a series of procedures and
standards that govern state employees responding to reports of child
abuse.9 The State thus owes a duty to abused children because, in
enacting its child protection statutes, it established a special
relationship between the State and children who are reported as
abused. Moreover, the State has an additional common law duty to
abused children because it voluntarily chose to protect such children.
The remaining elements of a negligence suit, breach of duty and an
injury proximately caused by that breach, should be determined on
the facts of each case and should be found only where there are
clear warning signs that a child should have been taken into
protective custody.
8. C.f. Otness v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 647,650 (D. Alaska 1959) (stating
the basic elements of a negligence claim).
9. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.142 (emergency custody and temporary
placement hearing), 47.10.230-.260 (care and placement of child), 47.17.010-.290
(reporting requirements) (1990 & Supp. 1992); see infra notes 10-16 and accompany-
ing text.
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A. Duty
1. Standards Created by the Alaska Code. Alaska's child abuse
statutes are similar to those of other states; the statutory scheme
provides a set of procedures designed to protect abused children.
Alaska Statutes section 47.17.010 sets forth the statutory purpose,
which emphasizes the protection of children identified to the State
as victims of abuse:
It is the intent of the legislature that, as a result of these reports
[of suspected abuse], protective services will be madd available
in an effort to
(1) prevent further harm to the child;
(2) safeguard and enhance the general well-being of
children in this state; and
(3) preserve family life unless that effort is likely to
result in physical or emotional damage to the child."l
When DHSS receives a report of child abuse, it must notify the
Department of Law, investigate the report and issue written findings
to the Department of Law within seventy-two hours of receiving the
report." Alaska Statutes section 47.17.020(e)(3) also requires that
DHSS immediately notify the nearest law enforcement agency upon
concluding that the situation involves either the possibility of
criminal conduct or "abuse or neglect that results in the need for
medical treatment of the child.'1
2
The statutes provide DHSS with an array of powers to protect
abused children. DHSS may refer the matter to an appropriate
local agency; if it does not, it must "for each report received,
investigate and take action, in accordance with the law, that may be
necessary to prevent further harm to the child or to ensure the
proper care and protection of the child."' 3 Before DHSS or a local
agency may seek the termination of parental rights, it must "offer
protective social services and pursue all other reasonable means of
protecting the child."'" Furthermore, DHSS may take a minor
child into emergency custody if the individual has been abandoned,
grossly neglected by his parents or guardian, or sexually abused.'
10. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.010 (1990).
11. Id. § 47.17.025(a).
12. Id. § 47.17.020(e)(3).
13. Id. § 47.17.030(a). If DHSS refers the matter to a local agency, that agency
has the same duty as DHSS would have had, and the agency must submit a report
to DHSS. Id. § 47.17.030(b).
14. Id. § 47.17.030(d).
15. Id. § 47.10.142(a).
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The State may also take a minor into custody if the child has been
abused or neglected by someone responsible for his welfare and
DHSS "determines that immediate removal from the minor's
surroundings is necessary to protect the minor's life or that
immediate medical attention is necessary.' 16
In these regards, Alaska's child protection statutes resemble
those enacted in other states. The laws in most states contain a
purpose clause revealing a legislative intent to protect abused
children.' Most statutes similarly set out specific procedures for
an agency to follow when it receives a report of child abuse. Upon
receiving reports of suspected abuse, most state agencies must
investigate them in accordance with provisions of state law and
administrative regulations.'
2. Recognizing a Statutory Duty of Care Toward Abused
Children. In considering social worker and/or state liability for
negligent investigations, most state courts have held that state child
abuse statutes create a special relationship between the State and a
child who is the subject of a child abuse report. This special
relationship gives rise to a duty of protection owed by the State to
the abused child. For example, in Brodie v. Summit County
Children Services Board,' the Ohio Supreme Court held that when
the state agency received a report that a child had been a victim of
abuse, the state child abuse statutes imposed a duty on the agency
"to take affirmative action on behalf' of that child.2' Courts in
Arizona, the District of Columbia,' Florida,24 North Caroli-
16. Id.
17. Laura H. Martin, Comment, Caseworker Liability for the Negligent
Handling of Child Abuse Reports, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1912 194 (1991) (citing FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 415.501(1) (West 1986)).
18. Id. at 195; see also Besharov, supra note 2, at 525, 529.
19. See, e.g., Mammo v. State, 675 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Turner v.
District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1987); Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1988); Coleman v. Cooper, 366
S.E.2d 2 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Brodie v. Summit County Children Servs. Bd., 554
N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio 1990); Reed v. Perry County Children's Servs., 1993 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3408 (Ohio App. June 29, 1993); Jensen v. Anderson County Dep't of
Social Servs., 403 S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1991); Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah
1989).
20. 554 N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio 1990).
21. Id. at 1308.
22. Mammo, 675 P.2d at 1351 (noting that the "statute in question is quite
specific and sets forth duties on the part of protective services workers which are
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na,' Ohio:2 6 South Carolina27 and Utah' have recognized that
state child abuse laws create a special relationship between the State
and the subject of an abuse report, thereby imposing on the State
a duty to protect the abused child.
In contrast, few courts have held that child protective agencies
have no duty toward children identified to them as victims of abuse.
In M.H. ex rel. Callahan v. State,29 the Iowa Supreme Court
acknowledged that the child protection statute might place a duty
on the State to protect an abused child but held that the legislature
that enacted the statute had not intended to create a private cause
of action." In Nelson v. Freeman,31 a federal district court held
that Missouri's child abuse statutes do not create a duty toward
clearly for the protection of threatened individuals" and that the state agency
therefore had a duty to act with reasonable care upon receiving a report of
suspected abuse).
23. Turner, 532 A.2d at 668 ("The Child Abuse Prevention Act imposes upon
certain public officials specific duties and responsibilities which are intended to
protect a narrowly defined and otherwise helpless class of persons: abused and
neglected children ....").
24. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258,
261 (Fla. 1988) (holding that the state agency "has a statutory duty of care to
prevent further harm to children when reports of child abuse are received").
25. Coleman v. Cooper, 366 S.E.2d 2, 7 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (observing that
"a standard of conduct may be determined by reference to a statute which imposes
upon a person a specific duty for the protection of others so that a violation of the
statute is negligence per se," and reasoning that a breach of the statute establishing
standards of conduct for the child protection agency constituted a breach of duty
giving rise to an action for negligence) (citing Lutz Indust. v. Dixie Home Stores,
88 S.E.2d 333 (N.C. 1955)).
26. Reed v. Perry County Children's Servs., 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3408, at
*11 (Ohio App. June 29,1993) (reasoning that "[a] duty is imposed by statute upon
appellants [including the Children's Services Board]," and the special relationship
thereby created is not abrogated by the governmental immunity statute).
27. Jensen v. Anderson County Dep't of Social Servs., 403 S.E.2d 615,619 (S.C.
1991) (social workers and child protection agency had a special duty to a child after
abuse had been reported).
28. Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187,1192 (Utah 1989) ("The Utah child abuse
prevention and treatment statute... creates a duty on the part of the State and the
[agency] to protect children who are identified to them as suspected victims of child
abuse.").
29. 385 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1986).
30. Id. at 537. The court also rejected the possibility that a common law cause
of action for malpractice existed in the social services context.
31. 537 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Mo. 1982), affd sub nom. Nelson ex reL Wharton
v. Missouri Div. of Family Servs., 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983).
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specific individuals.32 Consequently, the Nelson court ruled that
under the public duty doctrine-a common law rule conferring
immunity on government employees who owe a duty to the general
public rather than to a specific individual-no private cause of
action existed under the relevant statutes. 33
Under the reasoning employed by a majority of courts,
however, the public duty doctrine is inapplicable to caseworkers and
child protection agencies acting under statutory mandates to
investigate and act upon reports of individual cases of suspected
child abuse.34 For example, in Brodie v. Summit County Children
Services Board,35 the Ohio Supreme Court held:
[T]he public duty doctrine does not apply to the children
services board in view of the specific and mandatory language of[the Ohio statute] and the fact that the action required by the
statute is not directed at or designed to protect the public at
large, but intended to protect a specific child who is reported as
abused or neglected."
In fact, the Alaska Supreme Court has expressed general disapprov-
al of the public duty doctrine's grant of immunity as "outmoded,
artificial and 'in reality a form of sovereign immunity' contrary to
the desires of the legislature.37 For these reasons, Alaska courts
should not find Nelson persuasive.
Just as the statutory schemes in many states create a duty owed
by the State to reported victims of child abuse, the Alaska child
protection statutes impose a duty on the State to protect children
identified to DHSS as victims of abuse. An example of this
reasoning is found in Jensen v. Anderson County Department of
Social Services,8 in which the South Carolina Supreme Court listed
six elements which give rise to a "special duty" under a statute:
(1) an essential purpose of the statute is to protect against a
particular kind of harm;
32. Id. at 610.
33. Id. at 612.
34. See Martin, supra note 17, at 198.
35. 554 N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio 1990).
36. Similarly, in Jensen v. Anderson County Department of Social Services, 403
S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1991), the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the child
abuse statutes imposed a special duty on the agency, thus bringing the case within
an exception to the public duty rule. Id. at 617-19.
37. City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Alaska 1985) (quoting
Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1976)).
38. 403 S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1991).
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(2) the statute, either directly or indirectly, imposes on a specific
public officer a duty to guard against or not cause that harm;
(3) the class of persons the statute intends to protect is identifi-
able before the fact;
(4) the plaintiff is a person within the protected class;
(5) the public officer knows or has reason to know the likelihood
of harm to members of the class if he fails to do his duty; and
(6) the officer is given sufficient authority to act in the circum-
stances or he undertakes to act in the exercise of his office.39
The Alaska statutes evidence a legislative intent to protect children
from abuse and impose specific duties on the child protective
agencies to protect individual abused children.4° Because the
statutes also identify a specific class of individuals to be protected,
children who have been reported as abused, the public duty doctrine
is inapplicable. Social workers routinely encounter clear warning
signs of abuse, giving them notice of the likelihood of harm.
Because social workers are given statutory authority to place
children in emergency custody, they have sufficient authority to
act.41 The statutes therefore create a special relationship between
the State of Alaska and children who are subjects of child abuse
reports.42 This relationship imposes upon the State a duty to
protect those children.43
3. The Duty Created by the Common Law in Alaska. In addi-
tion to creating a special relationship, the State, by enacting child
protection laws, voluntarily undertook to investigate reports of child
39. Id. at 617.
40. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.010 (1990); see supra text accompanying
note 10.
41. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.142 (1990).
42. Even if the Jensen factors are not applied, the State of Alaska and its social
workers still owe abused children a duty of care: "'Duty is not sacrosanct in itself,
but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead
the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."' Besharov,
supra note 2, at 512 (quoting Smith v. Alameda County Social Serv. Agency, 153
Cal. Rptr. 712, 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)).
43. This duty applies equally to situations where a caseworker, rather than a
third party, reports abuse to the department. Social workers have a statutory duty
to report evidence of child abuse, and a social worker who fails to do so is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor. ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.020(a)(3), .068 (1990). This
penalty reaches a situation where a social worker notices (or should have noticed)
signs of child abuse but fails to report this to the department. If the social worker
reports the suspected abuse but then fails to adequately investigate it, the same
analysis regarding the imposition of liability for negligence applies as in cases where
the abuse is reported by a third party.
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abuse and to protect abused children, thereby creating a common
law duty to use due care in its investigation. The Alaska Supreme
Court has found such a duty in analogous situations. For example,
in Adams v. State,' a suit against the State for negligent failure to
alleviate fire hazards discovered during a state inspection of a hotel,
the court held that "the state assumed a common law duty by its
affirmative conduct.... [O]nce an inspection has been undertaken
the state has a further duty to exercise reasonable care in conduct-
ing fire safety inspections."'4
Similarly, in Wallace v. State, the plaintiff brought a wrongful
death action against the State after a worker's death resulted from
a safety violation previously discovered by state investigators.47 In
affirming the principle articulated in Adams, the supreme court held
that by initiating a safety inspection of the work site, the Depart-
ment of Labor had "voluntarily assumed a duty to use due care in
attempting to remedy the unsafe condition discovered in the course
of inspection."'  In deciding whether the State has assumed a
common law duty, "[t]he basic question is whether the [State] has
undertaken a responsibility. If it has, and it has failed adequately
to discharge that responsibility, it may be liable to people who have
been injured."49
Thus, in undertaking to receive and inquire into reports of child
abuse, the State has voluntarily assumed a duty to use due care in
investigating the reports and protecting abused children. This duty
arises under the common law and exists in addition to the State's
statutory duty under Title 47.
B. Breach of Duty and Injury
After establishing the existence of a duty of care, courts should
determine the remaining elements of negligence-breach of duty
44. 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976).
45. Id. at 240. The duty recognized in Adams is no longer consistent with the
Alaska Code; however, the current applicable statute denies an action for damages
only against municipalities. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070(d)(1) (Supp. 1992).
46. 557 P.2d 1120 (Alaska 1976).
47. Id. at 1122-23.
48. Id. at 1123.
49. City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309,1313 (Alaska 1985). This is the
type of liability envisioned by the United States Supreme Court in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). See supra
notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
1993]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
and an injury proximately caused by that breach-on a case-by-case
basis in accordance with traditional tort law principles of negligence.
To prove a breach of duty in a caseworker's failure to remove a
child from the home of an abusive parent or guardian, the plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonable
person in the caseworker's situation would have recognized clear
warning signs that the child was in danger of death or serious bodily
harm. Liability would typically arise in situations in which child
abuse is reported to the appropriate authority and the caseworker
fails to investigate, conducts an insufficient investigation, or ignores
clear signs that the child should be placed in protective custody.
The facts involved in instances of severe abuse can be chilling.
For example, in an Ohio case, Brodie v. Summit County Children
Services Board,50 a guardian ad litem filed suit against the Children
Services Board ("CSB") and its employees for negligent failure to
investigate reports of child abuse and to pursue dependency and
neglect proceedings on the child's behalf.5  According to the
child's affidavit, her father and the woman with whom he lived
starved her, shackled her to the bathroom sink for almost a month,
imprisoned her in stairwells, rooms, and closets, and burned, hit and
beat her, causing wounds which became infected in the absence of
medical treatment.52 Although evidence of abuse should have been
apparent, the caseworker assigned to the case successfully moved to
dismiss the dependency and neglect proceeding initiated by CSB.53
A few months later, a school guidance counselor informed CSB that
the child had missed school, lost weight, had dark circles under her
eyes and a burn on one hand.' Although the counselor, police
officers and a doctor met with the child, there was no evidence that
CSB renewed contact with her until several months later, after she
had been admitted to the hospital in a comatose condition in which
she would remain for five months.55
50. 554 N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio 1990).
51. Id. at 1303.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1304. The court ultimately remanded the case, holding that case-
workers are entitled to qualified immunity only when performing discretionary
functions. See infra text accompanying notes 112-113 for a discussion of how
Alaska courts determine whether state employees' conduct is discretionary.
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A case from Missouri, Nelson ex rel. Wharton v. Missouri
Division of Family Services,56 involved a failure to thoroughly
investigate reports of sexual abuse. The child protection agency
investigated only two of a number of calls received by its telephone
hotline describing a pattern of sexual abuse involving a child, her
mother and several men. The investigation consisted merely of brief
interviews with the mother and her children5 7 The investigators
failed to interview the children individually or in isolation from their
mother, to interview identified witnesses and to request physical
examinations of the children.-5 After this "investigation," the
mother prostituted her eight-year-old daughter for forty dollars to
a man who performed "various acts of perversion and sexual
intercourse" upon the child in front of her siblings. 9 The child
sustained severe physical injuries and died two weeks later; the
other children suffered extreme emotional injuries as a result of the
incident. 6
In both Nelson and Brodie, clear evidence signalled severe
abuse. Only in such cases, where there are "definite warning
signals, such as evidence of sexual abuse or abandonment, that
suggest the need to place a child in protective custody,",61 should
Alaska courts find that a plaintiff has proved breach of duty by a
preponderance of the evidence. In many cases, the warning signs of
severe abuse will be less clear, and it may be questionable whether
an abused child should be removed from his home. In such
borderline situations, the traditional negligence standard of
reasonableness would not require the caseworker to place the child
in protective custody. Imposing liability in such cases would create
an unpredictable standard and would likely increase the danger of
overintervention by social workers attempting to avoid liability.62
56. 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983).
57. Id. at 277.
58. Id.
59. Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F. Supp. 602, 604-05 (W.D. Mo. 1982), affd sub
nom. Nelson ex rel. Wharton v. Missouri Div. of Family Servs., 706 F.2d 276 (8th
Cir. 1983).
60. Id. at 605. Applying the public duty doctrine, the court held that the
plaintiff had no cause of action because the state child abuse statute created a duty
only to the general public. Id. at 611. But see supra notes 34-37 and accompanying
text for reasons why Alaska should reject the public duty doctrine in the child
abuse context.
61. Besharov, supra note 2, at 517.
62. See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
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III. IMMUNITY
Although the case law from other states remains divided,
Alaska's statutes and case law provide clear guidelines for determin-
ing if the State and its employees are immune from liability in
negligence actions. Neither social workers nor the state agency are
protected by the statutory immunity provisions contained in Title
47.' Moreover, the Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted the
governmental immunity statute' to deny such protection to the
State. Individual social workers, however, as state officials, are
immune from liability under the common law rule of official
immunity. This immunity is qualified rather than absolute; thus, a
social worker who acts in bad faith may still be liable for negligence.
A. Statutory Immunity under the Alaska Code
Alaska Statutes section 47.17.050 grants immunity from civil or
criminal liability to any person who, in good faith, reports suspected
child abuse, permits an interview in the school, or "participates in
judicial proceedings related to the submission of reports" under
Title 47.' Unlike some other states,' Alaska law does not
specifically immunize social workers or people who aid in the
investigation of child abuse reports.
Because the immunity provided by Title 47 does not apply to
social workers who negligently investigate child abuse reports, even
if a social worker reports the abuse, Alaska Statutes section 47.17-
.050 only shields the social worker from liability which might
63. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.050(a) (1990).
64. See id. § 09.50.250 (Supp. 1992).
65. Id § 47.17.050(a) (1990). The statute provides immunity from civil or
criminal liability which might otherwise be imposed only with respect to making the
report or permitting the interview. The statute explicitly denies immunity to
anyone who knowingly makes an untimely report and to those accused of
committing the child abuse or neglect. Id. § 47.17.050(a)-(b).
66. See Martin, supra note 17, at 197,201. States specifically immunizing social
workers include Louisiana, Minnesota and South Dakota. Id. at 197. States that
immunize anyone who aids in investigating reports of child abuse or fulfilling the
statutory mandate include Florida, Arizona and Illinois. Id. at 201-02. Although
the latter type of statute would seem to immunize social workers, some state courts
have held caseworkers liable without even mentioning the existence of such
statutes. Id. at 202 (citing Mammo v. State, 675 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983);
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258 (Fla.
1988)).
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otherwise be imposed for making the report. 7 The social worker
would essentially receive immunity only for participation in judicial
proceedings connected to the report of child abuse.' The position
that Alaska's social workers are not immune for the negligent
investigation of child abuse reports is consistent with that taken by
courts in other jurisdictions with similar immunity provisions. 9
Thus, the immunity provisions contained in Title 47 do not
release Alaska state social workers from liability for negligence. Any
immunity which might exist must be found under the statutory
67. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.050 (1990) ("[A] person who, in good faith, makes
a report under this chapter... is immune from civil or criminal liability that might
otherwise be incurred or imposed for making the report .... ).
68. Other jurisdictions also grant social workers prosecutorial immunity for the
initiation of child dependency proceedings. See, e.g., Meyers v. Contra Costa
County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
829 (1987); Nation v. Colla, 841 P.2d 1370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). Nation also
provides absolute immunity to social workers for actions taken in connection with
the pursuit of the child dependency proceeding and qualified immunity for
investigative actions preceding the filing of the dependency petition. Meyers and
Nation were federal actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, rather than
state tort actions and therefore were decided under different standards.
69. See, e.g., Brodie v. Summit County Children Servs. Bd., 554 N.E.2d 1301
(Ohio 1990). In Brodie, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an immunity statute
almost identical to the Alaska provision did not apply to social workers who
allegedly were negligent in failing to report, initiate and pursue judicial proceedings
because the statute "does not confer immunity upon those who fail to carry out the
mandate of the statute." Id. at 1309. The Ohio statute reads: "Anyone...
participating in the making of reports [required] under this section .... or anyone
participating in a judicial proceeding resulting from the reports, shall be immune
from any civil or criminal liability that otherwise might be incurred or imposed as
a result. .. ." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421(G) (Baldwin 1987) (amended
by OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421(6) (Baldwin Supp. 1991)).
In Coleman v. Cooper, 366 S.E.2d 2 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), the North
Carolina Court of Appeals examined a statute that provided immunity to anyone
who reported child abuse or cooperated with the department of social services in
any judicial proceeding or statutory program. In holding that the immunity
provision did not apply to employees of the department in the performance of their
official duties, the court pointed to the intent of the statute, which was "to
encourage citizens to report suspected instances of child abuse to the Director of
the department without fear of potential liability." Id. at 8.
While other courts have not addressed the immunity statutes directly, courts
in states with provisions similar to those of Alaska have found that there is no
governmental immunity for the negligent handling of child abuse reports (or that
there is no immunity if the social worker's functions are found to be discretionary).
See, e.g., Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258
(Fla. 1988).
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provision granting governmental immunity for discretionary
functions7" or under the common law doctrine of official immunity.
B. Governmental Immunity
1. Case Law from Other Jurisdictions. Most courts that have
considered the issue of social worker liability for the negligent
handling of child abuse cases have relied upon their interpretation
of state law regarding governmental immunity.7 Generally, states
provide governmental immunity to the State and/or state employees
for the performance of discretionary functions, but not for ministerial
ones. The two main policy rationales for granting immunity for
discretionary functions are (1) to preserve the separation of powers
by preventing courts from imposing tort liability for discretionary
decisions made by other branches of the government72 and (2) to
prevent private citizens from hindering the effective functioning of
government by challenging governmental policy decisions in
court.73
Courts outside Alaska are divided on the question of whether
an investigation of a child abuse report constitutes discretionary
conduct protected by governmental immunity. Michigan and Illinois
courts, for example, have found individual social workers and the
State to be protected by governmental immunity. The Michigan
Court of Appeals held that the activities of the State and state
agencies in dealing with reported child abuse are "clearly a
governmental function to which immunity applies."'74 Likewise, in
Midamerica Trust Co. v. Moffatt,75 the Illinois Court of Appeals
held that under the Illinois public duty doctrine protecting state
employees from liability for discretionary acts, a social worker's
70. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Supp. 1992).
71. See, e.g., Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258; Midamerica Trust Co. v. Moffatt, 511
N.E.2d 964 (111. Ct. App. 1987); Williams v. State, 376 N.W.2d 117 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985); Coleman v. Cooper, 403 S.E.2d 577 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991); Brodie, 554 N.E.2d
at 1301; Bradford v. Davis, 626 P.2d 1376 (Or. 1981); Jensen v. Anderson County
Dep't of Social Servs., 403 S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1991); National Bank of South Dakota
v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1982).
72. Japan Air Lines v. State, 628 P.2d 934, 936 (Alaska 1981).
73. Id.; Ebarb v. Stanislaus County, 246 Cal. Rptr. 845, 850 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988).
74. Williams, 376 N.W.2d at 118. The court failed to offer specific reasons for
its confidence that the activities were protected by governmental immunity.
75. 511 N.E.2d 964 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987).
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decisions in placing a foster child are discretionary and therefore
immune from liability, absent corrupt or malicious motives.76
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has taken a compromise
position. In Jensen v. South Carolina Department of Social
Services,77 the court noted that in most cases involving a report of
child abuse, the scope of the investigation and the decision to close
the file are discretionary matters protected by official immunity.78
However, because the caseworker and the child protection agency
in Jensen failed to conduct any investigation at all-despite a
statutory duty to do so-the court found that the defendants had
breached a mandatory, ministerial duty and therefore were not
immune from liability.79
Other courts have declined to extend immunity to the State
and/or individual social workers for negligence in child abuse or
foster placement cases. An Arizona court imposed liability on the
State for failure to act upon a report of child abuse without
addressing the issue of governmental immunity." In Department
of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Yamuni,s' the Florida
Supreme Court held that caseworkers' conduct in investigating and
responding to reports of child abuse constitutes an operational,
rather than discretionary, activity because the activity does not occur
at the policymaking level.' Thus, the agency was not immune
from liability.' The South Dakota Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion in National Bank of South Dakota v. Leir,4 holding that
sovereign immunity did not bar a suit against social workers for
negligent foster placementY The court found the responsibilities
76. Id. at 966-69.
77. 377 S.E.2d 102 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd (in part) sub nom. Jensen v.
Anderson County Dep't of Social Servs., 403 S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1991).
78. Id. at 107.
79. Id. at 107-08. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court remanded the
case to determine whether a thorough investigation was made and whether the
decision to close the file was discretionary. Jensen, 403 S.E.2d at 620.
80. Mammo v. State, 675 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). Similarly, in Turner
v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1987), the court, without mentioning
the issue of governmental immunity, held that the District of Columbia and its
employees could be held liable for negligence in failing to remove children from the
care of an abusive father.
81. 529 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1988).
82. Id. at 260.
83. Id.
84. 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1982).
85. Id. at 850.
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of social workers to be ministerial functions governed by established
guidelines for the placement and supervision of foster children.86
In Coleman v. Cooper,"7 a suit charging negligent handling of a
child abuse investigation, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
reversed a trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of a
social worker. The court of appeals found that the defendant was
a "mere employee" who was not entitled to the immunity reserved
for higher level public officials."
A few courts have left the immunity issue undecided. In
Brodie v. Summit County Children Services Board,89 for example,
the Ohio Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the child protection agency and its employees performed
discretionary or ministerial acts? Similarly, in Bradford v.
Davis,91 the Oregon Supreme Court remanded a suit for negligent
foster placement. The court sought a determination of whether the
defendant "had been delegated responsibility for a policy judgment
and exercised such responsibility," i.e., whether the defendant had
been engaged in a discretionary function protected by immunity.'
Thus, case law from other jurisdictions provides no clear
guidance on the immunity issue; the rulings vary from state to state.
Whether the State of Alaska and its social workers are immunized
from tort liability must be resolved by turning to the Alaska statutes
and case law regarding the immunity of the State and state employ-
ees in analogous situations.
86. Id.
87. 366 S.E.2d 2 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
88. Id. at 8; see also Hare v. Butler, 394 S.E.2d 231 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (social
workers were employees of the county agency, rather than public officers, and thus
could be held personally liable for negligence in the performance of their duties);
Olson v. Ramsey County, 497 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (social worker's
investigation in child abuse case was not protected by discretionary immunity
doctrine; thus, neither the social worker nor the county were immune from
liability). But see S.L.D. v. Kranz, 498 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (social
workers' decision that a call did not constitute a report of neglect was a discretion-
ary act; thus both the social workers and the county were immune from liability for
negligence).
89. 554 N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio 1990).
90. Id. at 1307. In a more recent case, however, the Ohio Court of Appeals
refused to grant immunity to a child protection agency for negligence in the
investigation of a report of child abuse. Reed v. Perry County Children's Servs.,
1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3408 (Ohio App. June 29, 1993).
91. 626 P.2d 1376 (Or. 1981).
92. Id. at 1382.
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2. Immunity of the State under Alaska law. As do other states
that have considered the question of liability for the negligent
handling of child abuse reports, Alaska has a statutory provision
regarding governmental immunity. Pursuant to Alaska Statutes
section 09.50.250, a person may bring a tort claim against the State
so long as the claim is not "based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a state agency or an employee of the State, whether
or not the discretion involved is abused."'93 The Alaska Supreme
Court has interpreted this statute on a number of occasions.
In State v. Abbott,94 the supreme court adopted a planning-
operational test to determine whether a function is discretionary or
ministerial.' Under this analysis, basic policy decisions occur at
the planning level and constitute discretionary functions immune
from attack under Alaska Statutes section 09.50.250. The perfor-
mance and implementation of those policy decisions, however, occur
at the operational level and are not protected by governmental
immunity.96 In Abbott, the plaintiff sought recovery for the negli-
gent maintenance of a state highway during the winter. The court
held that while the initial decision to maintain the highways during
the winter was made at the planning level, the implementation of
that policy decision occurred at the operational level: "[o]nce the
basic decision to maintain the highway in a safe condition through-
out the winter is reached, the State should not be given discretion
to do so negligently."'
93. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Supp. 1992). The statute also precludes a tort
action when based on the act or omission of a state employee "exercising due care,
in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not the statute or regulation
is valid." Id. This provision would not bar a negligence action, however, as a state
employee who acted negligently would by definition not have exercised due care.
94. 498 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972).
95. Id. at 721-22.
96. Id. The court observed that this test is consistent with the policy of
preserving the separation of powers, as it prevents the courts from passing judgment
on basic policy decisions made by other branches of the government. Id. at 721.
97. Id. at 722. Other Alaska cases have applied the planning-operational test
adopted in Abbott. For example, in State v. I'Anson, 529 P.2d 188, 193-94 (Alaska
1974), the court held that the State's failure to place a warning sign and no-passing
striping on a highway near the entrance road to a campground did not involve the
type of "broad basic policy decision" that would be considered a discretionary
function under the planning-operational test. In State v. Stanley, 506 P.2d 1284
(Alaska 1973), a crab vessel owner brought suit against the State because the vessel
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In Adams v. State,98 the court extended the planning-opera-
tional test adopted in Abbott to a case in which the State was not in
direct control of the instrumentality that caused harm. Adams
involved the State's failure to take action with regard to fire safety
hazards discovered during an inspection of a hotel which subse-
quently burned to the ground.99 The court held that the State
owed a duty of care to those injured as a result of the negligent
inspection." While the State's decision to inspect was a discre-
tionary decision made at the planning level, the negligent inspection
constituted an operational or ministerial act for which the State was
liable under Alaska Statutes section 09.50.250.01
Under the rationale of the Alaska Supreme Court decisions
applying the planning-operational test, the State is not immune from
liability for the negligent handling of child abuse cases by its
employees. Individual social workers do not formulate basic policy
decisions on whether to handle reports of child abuse. They are
merely implementing those policies expressed in Title 47 and in
agency guidelines. With the enactment of Title 47, the State made
a policy decision to investigate reports of child abuse. Once the
sank while in the possession of the State's representatives. Applying the planning-
operational test, the court found that the failure to exercise proper care in securing
the vessel occurred at the operational level and was not protected by discretionary
function immunity. Id. at 1291.
98. 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976).
99. Id. at 243.
100. Id. at 240. However, in State v. Jennings, 555 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1976), a
similar case decided the same day as Adams, the court made clear that the State
was not absolutely liable for allowing any violation of the fire safety code to
continue unabated. Id. at 250. In Jennings, the City of Fairbanks had inspected a
hotel that eventually was destroyed by fire. The court held that the State assumed
no duty where the State had not conducted its own inspection and did not have a
principal-agent relationship with the city that conducted the fire inspections and
enforced the fire code. Id.
101. Adams, 555 P.2d at 241,243-44. The court reached similar results in three
other cases involving the application of the planning-operational test. See Japan
Air Lines v. State, 628 P.2d 934, 938 (Alaska 1981) (decision to build airport
runway suitable for use by wide-body jets held to be a planning/policy decision, but
design decisions were operational decisions not immune from liability); Carlson v.
State, 598 P.2d 969, 973 (Alaska 1979) (decision to maintain highway turnout in
winter was planning/policy decision, but failure to remove garbage from turnout was
operational decision subject to liability when a bear attracted to the site injured
woman); Wallace v. State, 557 P.2d 1120, 1124 (Alaska 1976) (decision to inspect
work site was planning/policy decision, but negligent performance of the inspection
was operational/ministerial function not immune from liability).
[Vol. 10:2
CHILD ABUSE INVESTIGATION
decision to investigate is made, the performance of the investigation
constitutes a ministerial, operational act. Consequently, the State
owes a duty of care to children injured as a result of a negligent
investigation and may be liable in tort for such negligence under
Alaska Statutes section 09.50.250."°
3. Immunity of Individual Social Workers under Alaska Law.
The standard used to determine governmental immunity is different
for a state employee than for the State itself. When considering the
immunity of a state employee, Alaska courts do not apply the
planning-operational test described above but instead rely on a
common law rule. Both tests grant immunity for the performance
of a discretionary function, but the term "discretionary function" is
defined differently under the common law rule. Under this rule, a
discretionary act is one that requires ""'personal deliberation,
decision, and judgment. ' ' ' ' 1" 3
The Alaska Supreme Court has applied the common law rule
in various contexts to determine a state employee's personal
liability. The standard was first established in Bridges v. Alaska
Housing Authority,"°4 a suit against the Housing Authority and
102. Although the Alaska Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this specific issue,
an Alaska Superior Court recently denied the State's claim that Alaska Statutes
section 09.50.250 confers governmental immunity for the negligent failure to
adequately investigate child abuse reports or to conduct regular visits to the home.
Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Estate of Todd Burnette
v. State, No. 3AN-91-3595 CI (Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Oct. 29, 1993), at 13.
Other states that use the planning-operational test to determine whether a
function is discretionary have also held that the State is not immune from liability
in the child abuse context. See, e.g., Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs.
v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1988).
103. Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield, 739 P.2d 150, 155 (Alaska 1987)
(quoting State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305, 316 (Alaska 1984) (quoting WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 988-89 (4th ed. 1971))).
In Aspen Exploration, the court defined a discretionary function using the Haley
court's language, even though Haley involved a tort claim under the United States
Constitution.
The court did not explain why Alaska applies a different standard in the
context of individual liability than it does for sovereign immunity. The standards
may be different simply because the court prefers to apply the common law
standard until directed otherwise (as it was in the context of sovereign immunity
by Alaska Statutes section 09.50.250). The policy reasons discussed infra in part IV,
however, support the maintenance of distinct standards.
104. 375 P.2d 696 (Alaska 1962).
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two of its employees for an illegal taking. The court held that the
employees were public officers because they were employed by an
agency that existed to serve a public need." As public officers,
the employees were immune "under the well recognized rule that
affords such protection to a public officer, acting within the scope
of his official duties, for damages caused by a mistake by him in the
exercise of judgment or discretion, or because of an erroneous
interpretation of the law."'' 6 Later, in State v. Stanley,"° the
supreme court concluded that a state employee's failure to secure an
impounded crab vessel was not a discretionary act and therefore was
not protected by common law immunity." s In Earth Movers of
Fairbanks, Inc. v. State,"° however, the court held that a state
trooper who reduced the speed limit in a highway construction area
was immune from personal liability. His decision constituted a
discretionary act because it was a good faith determination of his
authority to maintain safe road conditions. 0
The court further explained the rule regarding a public official's
immunity in Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield,"' when a
rejected applicant for an offshore prospecting permit sued the
governor of Alaska. The court reasoned that in order to qualify for
official immunity, the conduct involved must be within the scope of
the official's authority and must be discretionary in nature.112
Using the now-standard language, the court defined a discretionary
act as an act requiring ""'personal deliberation, decision and
judgment,"' while a ministerial act amounts "'only to obedience
105. Id. at 702.
106. Id.
107. 506 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1973).
108. Id. at 1292 (labeling discretionary acts as "discretionary judgment-policy
decisions").
109. 691 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1984).
110. Id. at 283-84. The court held that the State was immune from liability as
well. Id. at 284. While the analysis in this case is somewhat confusing, the Alaska
Supreme Court has since explained that a close reading of Earth Movers "shows
that we applied statutory (sovereign) immunity [i.e., Alaska Statutes section
09.50.250] to the claims against the State, and common law (official) immunity to
the claims against the individual officer." Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield, 739
P.2d 150, 153 (Alaska 1987) (citing Earth Movers, 691 P.2d at 285 (Rabinowitz, J.,
concurring)).
111. 739 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1987).
112. Id. at 155. The court distinguished between an abuse of authority and
complete lack of authority. Where a state employee merely abuses his authority,
he may qualify for official immunity. Id. at 155 n.11.
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of orders, or the performance of a duty in which the officer is left
with no choice of his own."1'13
Under this common law rule, individual social workers in
Alaska are immune from personal liability for the negligent handling
of child abuse cases. As in Bridges v. Alaska Housing Authori-
ty,14 social workers are public officers; they are employed by an
agency that exists to serve a public need. Decisions involving the
removal of a child from his home clearly lie within the scope of the
duty and authority of social workers. Furthermore, such decisions
require personal deliberation and judgment. Although provided
with guidelines," 5 social workers are not merely performing a duty
in which they are given no latitude for action. Thus, although the
State owes a duty of care under Alaska Statutes section 09.50.250,
under the standards for official immunity established by Alaska case
law, social workers are immune from personal liability for negli-
gence in investigating child abuse reports.
4. Absolute versus Qualified Immunity. Official immunity, once
granted, may be either qualified or absolute. Most states have
adopted a rule of qualified immunity for public officials, which
protects an official from liability only where discretionary acts within
the scope of authority are performed "in good faith and are not
malicious or corrupt."'1 6 However, in Aspen Exploration Corp. v.
Sheffield,"7 the Alaska Supreme Court refused to adopt "an all or
nothing approach" to immunity."' The court held that whether
an official received absolute or qualified immunity would depend on
the particular circumstances and conduct involved in each case, with
special consideration given to these factors:
113. Id. at 155 (quoting State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305,316 (Alaska 1984) (quoting
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 988-89 (4th
ed. 1971))).
114. 375 P.2d 696 (Alaska 1962).
115. DIVIsION OF FAMILY AND YouTH SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND SOCIAL SERVICES (DHSS), CHILD PROTEcrivE SERVICES MANuAL (1989)
(a policy and procedure manual providing social workers with detailed guidelines
for conducting child abuse investigations).
116. Aspen Exploration, 739 P.2d at 158 (citing Trimble v. City & County of
Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 729 (Colo. 1985); Shellburne, Inc. v. Roberts, 238 A.2d 331,
338 (Del. 1968)).
117. 739 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1987).
118. Id. at 159.
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(1) The nature and importance of the function that the officer
performed to the administration of government (i.e. the
importance to the public that this function be performed; that it
be performed correctly; that it be performed according to the
best judgment of the officer unimpaired by extraneous matters);
(2) The likelihood that the officer will be subjected to frequent
accusations of wrongful motives and how easily the officer can
defend against these allegations; and
(3) The availability to the injured party of other remedies or
other forms of relief."9
In evaluating these considerations, a court should determine whether
qualified or absolute immunity applies to a given situation as a
matter of law.12 If qualified immunity applies, an inquiry into the
public employee's good faith becomes relevant.'
An evaluation of the factors set forth in Aspen Exploration
suggests that a social worker's liability for negligent handling of
child abuse reports must be qualified rather than absolute. The
proper performance of social workers' functions is crucial to serving
the public interest in protecting children from abuse. Imposing
liability on social workers who act with corrupt or malicious motives
will not impair the judgment of other social workers as long as they
know that they are indeed protected from liability when acting in
good faith. Moreover, qualified immunity will deter social workers
from acting in bad faith. Although some social workers may be
faced with false allegations of bad faith, they should find it relatively
easy to defend themselves against unsubstantiated claims as the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving corrupt or malicious motives.
These factors, particularly the importance of the social workers'
functions, outweigh the fact that there exists another available form
of relief (i.e., a suit against the State) and indicate that social
workers should be protected by qualified rather than absolute
imnunity.12
2
119. Id. at 159-60. The court limited application of the test to situations in which
a public employee violates a plaintiff's common law rights. The court explicitly
reserved opinion as to situations in which a public official allegedly violates
statutory or constitutional rights. Id. at 160 n.23.
120. Id. at 160.
121. Id.
122. This conclusion is in accord with that of Professor Douglas Besharov, a
leading scholar in the area of child abuse law. Besharov argues that good faith
immunity is necessary for a variety of policy reasons, the most important of which
is preventing overintervention by the social worker. See Besharov, supra note 2,
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IV. POLICY ISSUES
There are a number of valid policy arguments both supporting
and opposing the imposition of liability for the negligent investiga-
tion of child abuse reports. A rule that places liability on the State,
but not on the individual social worker, resolves most of the policy
difficulties created by the imposition of liability for negligent
investigations. Moreover, such a rule would serve the complementa-
ry purposes of compensating victims and deterring negligence.
A. Arguments for Granting Immunity
1. Effective Government. One of the most common arguments
for granting governmental immunity is that the imposition of tort
liability would inhibit effective governmental decisionmaking.'"
Courts in Alaska, however, have rejected this argument. In State v.
Abbott," the Alaska Supreme Court opined that the negligence
standard "is an extremely flexible standard, and consequently will
not inhibit the vigorous and effective performance by the State of
its duties in the way that a more rigid standard might."'" In
Wallace v. State,"6 the court rejected the argument that the
imposition of liability might deter the State from inspecting work
sites, reasoning that the State had a mandatory duty to inspect such
locations upon request and to enforce occupational safety and health
standards. 27 Thus, Alaska courts have not found the possible
at 549; Besharov, supra note 3, at 554-62. Besharov recognizes, however, that the
facts of the cases he analyzes demonstrate that sometimes civil or even criminal
liability is necessary, where the official's misconduct stems from actual malice or a
reckless disregard of legal requirements. Besharov, supra note 2, at 549, 552.
The conclusion is also consistent with the decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court in Brodie v. Summit County Children Services Board, 554 N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio
1990), which granted qualified rather than absolute immunity to social workers. Id.
at 1307.
123. See, e.g., Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So.
2d 258, 265-66 (Fla. 1988) (Overton, J., dissenting); Williams v. State, 376 N.W.2d
117, 119 (Mich. Ct. App 1985) (citing Elliott v. Department of Social Servs., 333
N.W.2d 603 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)); Timothy J. Courville, Note, Government
Liability for Failure to Prevent Child Abuse: A Rationale for Absolute Immunity, 27
B.C. L. REV. 949, 980 (1986).
124. 498 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972); see supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 725.
126. 557 P.2d 1120 (Alaska 1976).
127. Id. at 1124-25.
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prevention of effective functioning of government to be a persuasive
reason to grant immunity to the State.
Specifically, imposing liability on the State will not impair the
effective functioning of child abuse agencies, particularly because
Title 47 places a compulsory statutory duty on the State to investi-
gate reports of child abuse. Child protection agencies will not and
cannot stop investigating reports of abuse. If anything, the
imposition of liability will enhance the functioning of those agencies
by deterring negligence.
2. Overintervention. The imposition of personal liability on
individual social workers would clearly have a negative effect. The
most compelling argument for granting individual immunity is that
if liability is imposed, social workers will attempt to avoid personal
liability by placing children in protective custody in cases where such
action may not be necessary." Such overintervention would harm
many children unnecessarily, interfere with parental rights and
directly conflict with Alaska's policy of keeping families together
whenever possible. This policy is manifested in Title 47, which
explicitly declares as one of the statute's purposes:
[To] preserve and strengthen the child's family ties unless efforts
to [do so] are likely to result in physical or emotional damage to
the child, [and to] remov[e] the child from the custody of the
parents only as a last resort when the child's welfare or safety or
the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded
without removal. 29
The threat of overintervention is a strong argument for granting
qualified immunity to individual social workers, as the threat of
128. For an extensive discussion of the problem of overintervention, see Besh-
arov, supra note 3, at 554-62; Besharov, supra note 2, at 547-48; Courville, supra
note 123, at 980.
129. ALASKA STAT. § 47.05.060 (1990). This policy is repeated in Alaska
Statutes §§ 47.17.010, which provides that the intent of the legislature is to "pre-
serve family life unless that effort is likely to result in physical or emotional damage
to the child," and 47.17.030, which states: "Before the department or a local govern-
ment health or social services agency may seek the termination of parental rights
•.. it shall offer protective social services and pursue all other reasonable means
of protecting the child." Id. §§ 47.17.010, .030(d).
A number of Alaska cases under Title 47 have also recognized this policy.
See, e.g., D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Alaska 1986); In re J.R.B., 715 P.2d
1170, 1173 (Alaska 1986); State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269, 278 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984);
E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210,1213 n.5 (Alaska 1981); Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344,
346 (Alaska 1981).
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personal liability would likely lead to the placement of children in
protective custody where such action is unnecessary. Imposing
liability on the State rather than on individual social workers will
not have the same effect, however, because the individuals making
the decisions will not bear the risks of personal liability. Further
mitigating the danger of overintervention is the fact that the State
and its employees are faced with the possibility of a lawsuit by the
parents if they remove a child from the home unnecessarily, thereby
violating parental rights.3 0 This threat should counterbalance any
incentive for the State to act hastily in removing children from their
homes.
3. Cost. Another legitimate concern with the imposition of
liability on the State is that such liability would unduly strain public
funds.' 3 ' While this is undoubtedly true, the Alaska Supreme
Court has observed in a number of cases that the State, in waiving
immunity from tort liability in most cases, has adopted a policy of
spreading the risk of negligence over all taxpayers rather than
imposing it on the individual victim. Furthermore, in In re
E.A.O., the court rejected the argument that imposing the
medical costs of children in its care on DHSS would deter the
department from taking legal custody, noting that "[w]hether the
department is adequately funded to carry out its statutory responsi-
bilities, or whether those responsibilities should be changed in
130. Marcia C. Sprague, Defining the Risks After DeShaney, 11 CHILDREN'S
LEGAL RTs. J. 8,12-14 (1990); see also Coverdell v. Department of Social & Health
Servs., 834 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court also mentioned this possibility in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989), stating in defense of the social workers that "had they moved too soon to
take custody of the son away from the father, they would likely have been met with
charges of improperly intruding into the parent-child relationship." Id. at 203.
Social workers should be immune from personal liability in this type of
situation also, because under the common law doctrine of official immunity, they
are performing a discretionary function by placing a child in protective custody.
131. See, e.g., Courville, supra note 123, at 980; Besharov, supra note 2, at 546-
47. Besharov points out that the State must pay extensive legal fees to defend even
unfounded suits, and that there is an additional cost to the system in the suspension
or transfer of child welfare workers. Id.
132. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235,244 (Alaska 1976); State v. Abbott,
498 P.2d 712, 724 (Alaska 1972).
133. 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991).
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response to budgetary realities, is a question for the legislature to
answer.
134
Thus, it seems that Alaska courts would not be receptive to an
argument for immunity based on the rationale that imposing liability
would be too costly for the State. Instead, the risk of negligence by
social workers should be spread across all taxpayers rather than
imposed on individual victims of the State's negligence. The
possibility that the imposition of liability would leave child protec-
tive services with insufficient funds to carry out their duties would
be a problem for the Alaska legislature to address.
4. Disincentive Effect. A final argument against the imposition
of liability for the negligent handling of child abuse reports is that
it would create a disincentive for persons wishing to enter the field
of social work. One commentator advances a similar point by
arguing that imposing liability on social workers would often result
in unfair blame. 35 In many cases, the fault lies not with the
individual social worker, but with decisions made at a higher level
or with the chronic problems of understaffing and insufficient
funding."6 This danger may be avoided, however, by imposing
liability solely on the State and not on individual social workers.
B. Arguments for Imposing Liability for Negligence
1. Deterrent Effect. Imposing liability for the negligent
handling of child abuse reports will, to some degree, deter negli-
gence. It is not necessary to impose liability on individual social
workers, however; deterrence can be accomplished by imposing
liability only on the State. The state agency will thus be given an
incentive to ensure - through training, supervision and enforcement
of its guidelines - that its caseworkers thoroughly investigate
134. Id. at 1358. This argument is similar to that advanced in Turner v. District
of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1987), which held that the concern for the
depletion of public resources was eliminated by a specific provision in the D.C.
Child Abuse Prevention Act that required the agency to have sufficient staff and
resources to accomplish the purposes of the act. Id. at 673.
135. Besharov, supra note 2, at 545-46.
136. Id Besharov also argues that in many cases it is unfair to blame
caseworkers because of the difficulty inherent in detecting and predicting child
abuse. Id. at 545. In such cases, where it is not clear that the child should have
been removed from the home, courts should not impose liability on either the State
or the individual social worker.
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reports of abuse and remain alert to signs that a child should be
placed in protective custody. If threatened with liability, the State
may also become "more creative and energetic about finding new
solutions to the problem.' 1
37
Preventing negligence in the handling of child abuse cases will
best be achieved by imposing liability only where there are definite
warning signs of severe abuse. Such a solution is more reasonable
for social workers, as it provides them with guidance, lessening their
uncertainty about when their actions may prompt a negligence suit.
Providing social workers with a consistent legal standard will both
enhance the deterrent effect of imposing liability and reduce the risk
of overintervention discussed above.
2. Compensation. Imposing liability for negligence will also
provide compensation to the victims of that negligence. Such
compensation would be in accord with Alaska's policy of risk-
spreading, in that "society, rather than the injured individual, should
bear the cost of the state's negligence.' 3 8 The goal of compensat-
ing victims is best achieved by imposing liability on the State, not on
the individual social worker. Only the State can spread the risk
over all taxpayers, and in most cases, only the State can afford to
pay the judgment. Commentators have suggested a number of ways
the State could finance these costs, including the purchase of liability
insurance, the creation of statutory limits on claims against the State
and the passage of floating bond issues.'39
V. CONCLUSION
Both the State and its social workers have a duty to protect
children identified to them as victims of abuse. This duty arises
under Title 47 of the Alaska Code, which creates a special relation-
ship between the State and the abused children, as well as under the
common law. The issues of breach of duty and injury to the victim
should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Liability for
negligence should be imposed only when a plaintiff proves by a
137. Martin, supra note 17, at 218. One commentator argues that imposing
liability on individual social workers would "frustrate this goal [of deterring
negligence] because more often than not, the source of the problem is found in
organizational conditions." Id.
138. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235,244 (Alaska 1976); see also State v. Abbott,
498 P.2d 712, 724 (Alaska 1972).
139. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 17, at 217.
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preponderance of the evidence that there were definite warning
signals, such as evidence of sexual abuse or abandonment, that a
child should have been placed in protective custody.
Individual social workers have qualified immunity under
common law official immunity principles established by Alaska case
law. Under the Alaska governmental immunity statute, however,
the State is not immune from liability for the negligent handling of
child abuse reports by its employees because the employees are not
performing discretionary functions as defined by the planning-
operational test. Thus, the State can be held liable for negligence
under Alaska law, but a social worker acting in good faith can-
not.'4°
Imposing liability on the State but not on individual social
workers either removes or mitigates most of the policy concerns
regarding the imposition of liability. This solution is less likely to
interfere with the effective functioning of government or lead to
overintervention by social workers. It also removes the problem of
placing unfair blame on social workers and eliminates a disincentive
for individuals considering entering the profession. At the same
time, imposing liability on the State furthers the important goals of
deterring negligence and compensating victims of that negligence.
Thus, policy considerations as well as Alaska state law dictate that
liability for negligence in the handling of child abuse investigations
be imposed only upon the State.
Susan Lynn Abbott
140. This conclusion is consistent with the position taken by many commentators.
See, e.g., Besharov, supra note 2, at 549; see generally Martin, supra note 17. But
see Courville, supra note 123, at 985, 987 (arguing that both the State and the
individual caseworkers should be absolutely immune in the context of a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim).
Some argue that the best way to immunize social workers is to enact a statute
specifically granting them immunity. Besharov, supra note 2, at 551-2; Martin,
supra note 17, at 211-12, 219.
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